Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Verla H. Carter v. Gerald W. Carter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dave Mcmullin; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Patrick H. Fenton; Attorney for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Carter v. Carter, No. 914554.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3839

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFU
45.9
.S8
DOCKET NO.

BRlEf

IN THE SUPREME COURTIDF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERLA H. CARTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14554

)

GERALD W. CARTER,

)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

APPELLANTS BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTIICT COURT OF THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFlrHE STATE OF UTAH,
IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY
HONORABLE J. HAREAN BURNS, Judge

PATRICK H. FENTON
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
DAVE MCMULLIN
City Office Building
Payson, Utah 84651
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO MODIFY SAID
DECREE OF DIVORCE
.

3

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT IN
ANOTHER HEARING AND NOT PRESENTED IN
THIS HEARING

7

CONCLUSION

9

STATUTES CITED
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended. . *

1

3

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VERLA H. CARTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14554

GERALD W. CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a brief on the refusal of the Court to
exercise its discretion and modify an existing Decree of
Divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This item arose in Juab County, Utah.

Prior to

the divorce, the parties had accumulated considerable
properties in Levan area of Juab County, Utah.

In addition,

the defendant and appellant was a construction worker and
had tremendous income producing capacities.

A Decree of

Divorce was entered on,or about, the 12th of June, 1973,

-2which, among other things, awarded the plaintiff $200.00 per
month alimony, the home of the parties in Hevan, Utah, considerable farming property and other property in the Levan
area.

In the due course of events, a Petition to Modify

the Decree of Divorce to reduce the alimony was filed before
the above entitled court, the defendant and appellant alleging
change of circumstances.

Primarily the hearing on 14 January,

1976, is the controlling item in this matter, and as a result
thereof, the trial Judge refused to modify the Decree of
Divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The reversal of Judge Burns1 Order refusing to
modify the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce and the alimony
provisions therein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of the divorce, defendant was an
able-bodied man, and in addition to the property acciomulations
that the trial Court disposed of at the time of the divorce,
had a tremendous earning capacity of approximately $21,000.00.
At the time of the hearing on the modification, defendant had

-3remarried, and his earning capacity was approximately one-half
of the amount at the time of the divorce.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO MODIFY SAID DECREE OF DIVORCE.
There is no question this comes under the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, being provided for
by Section 30-3-5 of same, allowing the trial Court to keep
jurisdiction to make modifications wherever they might be
proper.
While there were considerable arguments and a great
deal of court hearings back and forth about properties,
violations of each others property rights awarded by the
Court at the time of the divorce and items of this nature,
these hearings were based primarily upon putting into effect
the Court's Decree and differences in opinion as to how this
should be done and whether the parties had correctly interpreted the Decree and taken the property.

At the time of

the divorce the plaintiff and respondent was awarded the
home in Juab County, Utah, and, in the opinion of the undersigned, a more than equitable share of the property that had

-4been accumulated there.

At the time of the divorce in addition

to the property items and items of this nature, the income of
which was later denied to the appellant by giving the properties
to the respondent, the appellant was also steadily employed in
construction work and making $21,000.00 a year.
of 14 January, 1976, page 33,

line 11)

(See transcript

This is uncontested.

In addition, at the time of the hearing for modification, the
properties that had previously been awarded to the plaintiff
were capable of producing in excess of $2,000.00 a month
properly operated.
32, line 21.)

(See transcript of 14 January, 1976, page

This is over and above the home and various

other things that had been provided for the plaintiff.

At

the time of the hearing for modification, to-wit, 14 January,
1976, the defendant and appellant was on unemployment, and
the construction type work he had been doing was no longer
available.

He had been laid off by Utah International in

Cedar City, Utah.

However, he had made the mistake of

remarrying a girl that in Cedar City, Utah was locally
termed as an heiress.

There had been hearings on other

items pertaining to the estate from which the defendant's
present wife was to inherit from that colored the Judge's
thinking in this particular matter.

The same Judge having

-5set in Iron County on the estate items and now setting in
Juab County on the divorce and modification item.

In

addition to remarrying and taking on other obligations, the
primary purpose for the modification was the reduction in
income.

Although drawing unemployment at the time of the

hearing, thei defendant at that time was employed by Utah
International at the Cedar City Iron Mines, and his
anticipation of employment was between ten and twelve
thousand dollars per year when fully employed, without
consideration of the layoffs.

(See transcript of 14

January, 1976, page 33, line 27)

It was the appellant1s

thinking that under these conditions his income had been
reduced to better than half and he asked for modification
of the Decree of Divorce and the alimony provisions therein
hy half.

This was refused by the trial Court.
There is no question this was an abuse of

discretion.

The only reason that can possibly be

attributed to the failure of this nature to consider,
bearing in mind that the divorce decree itself had made a
wealthy woman out of the plaintiff, provided her with
considerable income property in addition to the home and
items of this nature, and in addition to this the plaintiff was producing income frorri work in the Juab County area,

6the only consideration that can be given is the trial Court
erred in failing to consider these items.

This is especially

true when one considers that the trial Court admittedly
considered items not presented in evidence.

In this particular

case, the defendant having testified at thd time of the hearing
on modification that he was under a doctor's supervision and
that many types of construction equipment he could no longer
ride.

He was limited to welding and repaid work and things

of this nature.

(See transcript 14 Januar^, 1976, page 34,

line 6 to page 35, line 24)

Although the back injury was

ancient, it had not been bothering him at the time of the
divorce, but at the time of the hearing of the modification
was active and work was limited pursuant to doctor's orders.
Under these conditions, there can be no question
that the trial Court failed to give consideration to the
testimony as it was presented, and there is no question
that there was a substantial change in conditions.

At any

time any person has their income reduced from $21,000.00 a
year to ten to twelve thousand dollars a year, takes on
additional obligations, has health problems) that limit the
type of work they can do, there is a substantial change in
conditions.

Also, it is common knowledge that if anyone

-7rides construction equipment long enough, they are going to
have back troubles that will impair them the later portion of
their life and impair their incapacities.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED INFORMATION AVAILABLE
TO THE TRIAL COURT IN ANOTHER HEARING AND NOT
PRESENTED IN THIS HEARING.
It has always been the understanding of the undersigned in very limited and severely curtailed law practice in
the State of Utah that juries and courts were limited to considering as evidence only the things presented.

The under-

signed has some faint memory of having heard the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns, who was judge on this item, instruct juries to
the effect that they consider nothing not presented in the
courtroom.

There had been considerable proceedings in Iron

County, Utah, before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns prior to
the hearing for modification of Decree of Divorce in the
matter of the estate of George W. Hunter, deceased, pertaining
to cattle operations and items of this nature, where the
defendant, Gerald W. Carter, had testified as to possible
operations for cattle, lease operations that he might be

-8interested in and items of this nature.

The present Mrs.

Carter, one of the heirs in that estate, had a local
reputation of having received considerable property thereby.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the present plaintiff,
Verla H. Carter, together with her present attorney, Dave
McMullin, considered bringing an alienation of affections
suit against the present Mrs. Gerald W. Carter, and in one
instance the undersigned was so advised by Dave McMullin.
It stands to reason that there was considerable local
gossip about the defendant in the instant case marrying
an heiress, both in Iron County and Juab County.
There is no question that in refusing to modify
the Decree of Divorce, the trial Court considered evidence
from outside the courtroom, and very honestly immediately
made a disclosure to both counsel of same.

See transcript

14 January, 1976, page 50, line 9 to line 22, which is as
follows:
M

THE COURT: Mr Fenton, Mr. McMullin, before
you go further and since it is part of the Court's
ruling in this matter and counsel for each of
the parties are entitled to know the basis of
the Court's ruling, in addition to the testimony
heretofore heard in this matter and heard today
in this matter the Court is not unmindful of the
testimony of this defendant that he was capable
physically and qualified to run cattle and lease
property and operate a ranch operation in the

-9other matter the Court referred to pending
in Iron County, Frankly, this Court, and I
would assume any other court cannot divorce
entirely testimony heard in other matters
bearing directly upon the same type issues
and you are entitled to that being in the
record and the record so reflects."
CONCLUSION
This item should be remanded back to the trial
Court with orders to grant the Petition for Modification and
cut the alimony in two, pursuant to the original Petition
for Modification.
Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant

